The question before the court in Zaheer-ud-Din was a purely Constitutional one and appellants scrupulously confined their arguments to the Constitutional question. The religious controversies or doctrinal issues were neither raised by the appellants nor argued, nor were they germane to the points in issues. It is axiomatic that a judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeves of his robe. Even so the judges are not infallible in deciding even the pure questions of law. Notwithstanding the presumption about their profound knowledge of law, judges are not necessarily presumed to be well versed in all the sciences, fine arts, metaphysics, mysticism or scriptures or exigecies. The entire argument based on religious controversy is misplaced. The present author does not wish to include any detailed comments on the religious issues or theological debate and has left that to be treated in a different treatise to which the reader must return for a fuller account of religious argument.

As one reads the majority opinion in Zaheer ud Din one is struck by the language of the judgment. The apex court of Pakistan has held that, “If a judge includes improper language, or becomes excitable then the impersonal concept of the seat of justice gets a rude shock.” and that, “A judge who adorns the seat of justice should always be careful to maintain the dignity of his office. If a judge becomes excitable and insultive to a party or a counsel then the confidence of the public is liable to be  shaken in  the administration of justice.” ⁰³ It is not the province or duty of the court to pronounce on the truth of religious belief. Expression of opinions in matters of religious faith has also been disapproved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan because, “In such matters there can always be room for some difference of opinion and a Judge should not assume the role of an adviser or theologian.” ⁰⁴ That is precisely what Abdul Qadeer J has done in Zaheer-ud-Din. Ahmadis have been advised by the court to coin their own epithets. He has in fact suggested change of theology for Ahmadis by validating a law, which clearly infringes religious freedom.

The majority opinion in Zaheer ud Din appears continuously locked up in a religious and theological debate with Ahmadis and appears to be arguing the case of fundamentalist mainstream Muslims against the Ahmadiyya belief. The effort is scarcely veiled. The language used is not only improper and excitable but manifestly abusive and provocative. It has been described in the international circles as “a diatribe against the Ahmadiyya belief and as having no place in judicial rulings.” ⁰⁵ From some of the observations, which dropped from his pen, the learned judge seems to have reserved his choicest venom against Ahmadis. He describes their faith as hollow, relying on deception and refers to the founder of the movement in a language of ridicule and goes to the extent of inciting and sanctioning violence against Ahmadis. On account of this language the impersonal character of the seat of justice has indeed received a rude shock.

A senior Pakistani lawyer Barrister, A.G.Chaudhry, writing an analytical comment on Zaheer-ud-Din observed:

One is reminded of the observation of the American Supreme Court in Lukumi Babalu Aye Vs Hialeh

It would have been just, fit and proper for the court to take heed to the word of God,

In Zaheer-ud-Din the religious argument is in excess of jurisdiction and irrelevant to the Constitutional questions raised.

The majority opinion appears ready, willing and keen to catch at every and any argument to validate the ordinance. In that effort court has traveled far beyond its jurisdiction. The court canvassed a socio-political argument and proceeded to record a finding that:

All this could not possibly be construed to mean that Ahmadis have always wanted to be a separate entity from the Muslims and that they were non Muslims of their own choice. Historically the Ahmadis have throughout maintained their Islamic identity and the very challenge before the Supreme Court indicated that. The fact that the court in its judgment was suggesting Ahmadis to modify their practices distinct from Muslim practices, and not to insist on the Islamic practices, destroys the argument of the Majority opinion. It however, amply demonstrates the socio political bias, which runs through the judgment.

In fact the entire argument based on social cohesion and dissident minority needs to be closely examined. This argument was pressed into service in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to salute the flag. To salute or not to salute the national flag did appear to involve a question of National Unity. But that argument adopted in Gobitis was strongly repudiated in Barnette with the following observations,

Unfortunately however where the expediencies of governments and trends of majority groups are made the basis of judgment, the majority opinions even though served under the name of religion are often a very complex socio political cum religious phenomenon and religion is often used as a ploy.

The religious and socio political argument is irrelevant and the statute and the judgment validating the statute, both are steeped into animosity, prejudice and bias. The judgment is therefore vitiated and needs to be reconsidered.