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SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J:-
| The question of law of public importance common to all these appeals in whether Ordinance No. XX of 1984, The Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahore Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984 is ultra vires the Constitution. If not, whether the convictions recorded and the sentences imposed in five criminal appeals are in accordance with Section 5 introduced by it. |
2. | Chronologically considered, Constitution Petition No. 2591 of 1984 leading to Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1989 was the first to be filed. It was filed on 30-5-84 within a month and a half of the promulgation of the Ordinance XX of 1984 (which was promulgated on 26-4-84). The reliefs sought therein were that the Ordinance (i) is of no legal effect and is void ab initio since the day it was promulgated; and (ii) is ultra vires the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. This Constitution Petition was dismissed in limine on 12-6-84 treating Article 203-D of the Constitution to be a bar. Au Intra Court Appeal was also dismissed in limine on 25-9-84, by considering the various grounds taken therein on merits. Leave to appeal was granted on 28-2-89 to examine the vires of the Ordinance XX of 1984 on the touchstone of Fundamental rights (Article 19 - Freedom of Speech, Article 20 - Freedom of Religion, Article 25 - equality of citizens). |
3. | In 1984 Constitution Petition No. 2309 of 1984 was filed in the High Court leading to Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1989 before us. This petition was amended on 6-6-84 and the following reliefs were claimed in it: — “The petitioner respectfully prays that - (i) the impugned Ordinance No. XX of 1984 is of no legal effect. (ii) the petitioner has the fundamental right to profess, practice and propagate his religion. (iii) It is further prayed that the Respondent may be directed not to take any action, under the Ordinance, against the petitioner, till the final disposal of this written petition.”
This Petition too was dismissed in limine on 12-6-84 treating as barred by Article 203-D of the Constitution. The Intra Court Appeal was also dismissed in limine on 25-9-84 after discussing all the grounds and without sustaining the bar of Article 203-D of the Constitution. As regards the violation of the Fundamental Rights, the Appeal Bench observed as hereunder:
“If the Constitution of 1973 had been in force in its entirety the argument of the appellants would have been worth examination but this is not so, for three supra constitutional documents have since July, 1977 eclipsed the Constitution. The first in this context is the Proclamation of Martial Law which became effective on the 5th of July, 1977. It placed the Constitution in abeyance. The second is the Chief Martial Law Administrator’s Order No. I of 1977, also known as the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977. Although clause (i) of Article 2 of this order inter alia did state that Pakistan would be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Constitution but then clause (iii) of the same Article placed all Fundamental Rights under suspension. The third document is the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, promulgated on the 24th of March, 1981. Article 2 of this order has adopted certain provisions of the Constitution of 1973. It is significant to note that the adopted certain provisions do not include any of the Fundamental Rights, including Article 20 upon which the appellants relay. Thus the said Article, like all other Fundamental Rights is not enforceable at present. It is, therefore, idle on the part of the appellants to suggest that the said Article continues to remain a rider of the Ordinance making power of the President. We would accordingly reject the contention of the appellants that even under the present constitutional position the President, while making an Ordinance still suffers from the limitations act out in the Fundamental Rights.” Leave to appeal was granted on 28-2-89 in terms as in Civil Appeal No. 149/89 as above. |
4. | Nazir Ahmed Taunsvi an active Muballigh reported at Police Station City Quetta 17-3-85 at 6:20 p.m. that on receiving information he went to the Bazar, found Muhammad Hayat appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 35-K of 1988, a Quadiani by faith, wearing a badge of Kalma Tayyaba and claiming to be a Muslim. A case under section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was registered. On trial he was convicted under section 298-C PPC and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the court and a fine of rupees three thousand or in default three months simple imprisonment. His appeal and revision were dismissed. Leave to appeal was granted on 12-9-88 to examine the following questions of law:
“1) | Whether wearing a “Kalma Tayyaba” badges by an Ahmadie amounts to posing as a Muslim so as to come within he mischief of Section 298-C, Pakistan Penal Code; |
2) | Whether the charge framed against the petitioners was in accordance with the law, and if not what is its effect; and |
3) | Whether section 298-C, Pakistan Penal Code is violative of Fundamental Rights Nos. 19, 20 and 25?” |
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5. | Nazir Ahmed Tanusvi, lodged two other such reports on 27-3-85. One (FIR No. 49/85) made similar complaint against Zaheeruddin (Appellant in Cr. A. 31-K/88) having encountered him at 1:00 p.m. in the Bazar with a badge of Kalma Tayyaba and claiming himself to be a Muslim. On trial, he was convicted under section 298-C of Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rupees one thousand failing which one months rigorous imprisonment. His appeal and revision against conviction and sentence failed. The other report (FIR No. 50/85 was directed on similar facts against Abdur Rehman (Appellant in Cr.A. 34-K/88) who he encountered in the Bazar at 3:30 p.m. He was also convicted and sentenced to one year’s R.I. and a fine of rupees one thousand or in default one month’s R.I. His appeal and revision failed. In both these appeals the leave to appeal was granted as in Criminal Appeal No. 35-K/88. |
6. | On 11-4-85, Haji Baaz Muhammad a shopkeeper lodged a report (FIR No. 59/85 City Quetta) complaining that a customer came on his shop with a badge of Kalma Tayyaba. He disclosed his name a Majid (appellant in Cr. A. No. 33-K/88) and claimed to be a Quadiani. On trial, he was convicted under section 298-C of Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to one year’s R.I. and a fine of rupees one thousand or in default one month’s R.I. His appeal and revision failed. He was granted leave to appeal in terms as in Criminal Appeal No. 35-K/88. |
7. | On 8-5-85, Muhammad Azim another shopkeeper lodged a report (FIR No. 74/85 P.S. City Quetta) complaining that Rafi Ahmed (appellant in Cr. A. 32-K/88) appeared before him with a badge of Kalma Tayyaba though he was a Quadiani. He was tried and convicted under section 298-C of Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to one year’s R.I. and a fine of rupees one thousand or in default one month’s R.I. His appeal and revision failed. He was granted leave to appeal as in Criminal Appeal No. 35-K/88. |
8. | A Constitution Petition (No..2089/89 was filed on 12-4-89 challenging the decision of the Punjab Government dated 20-3-89, its implementation by District Magistrate Jhang by order dated 21-3-89 and its extension till further orders by order dated 25-3-89 by Resident Magistrate. The effect of these decisions/orders was that the Quadianis in District Jhang were prohibited from indulging in following activities:
“(i) | Illumination on buildings and premises; |
(ii) | Erection of decorative gates; |
(iii) | Holding of processions and meetings; |
iv) | Use of loudspeaker or megaphone; |
v) | Raising of Slogans; |
vi) | Exhibition of badges, bunting and banners, etc.; |
vii) | Distribution of pamphlets and pasting of posters on the walls and wall-writings; |
viii) | Distribution of sweets and service of food; |
ix) | Any other activity directly or indirectly which may incite and injure the religious feelings of Muslims.” |
The High Court by an exhaustive judgment dismissed this Petition. Leave to appeal was granted (Civil Appeal No. 412 of ‘92) by reference to order granting leave in Civil Appeals No. 149/89 and 150/89. |
9. | Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants in five Criminal Appeals (Cr. Appeals No. 31-K to 35-K/88) has mainly taken up the constitutional vires of the Ordinance XX of ‘84. According to him, Ordinance XX of ‘84 is oppressively unjust, abominably vague, perverse, discriminatory, produce of biased mind, so mala fide and wholly unconstitutional being violative of Articles 19, 20 and 25 of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel the Constitution, having by its second amendment categorized the Quadianis and Ahmadis as non-muslim, by clause (3) of Article 260 proceeds further to distinguish from among non-muslims the Quadianis and Ahmadis with a view to impose on them prohibitive restrictions, on their religious practices, utterances and beliefs. According to the learned counsel, 1790 criminal cases have been registered against this specific minority up to 1992 and are pending in courts; 84 for offering daily prayers, 691 for use of Kalma Tayyaba, 36 for reciting Azaan, 251 for preaching religion, 676 for posing as a Muslim, 52 for using Islamic Arabic expressions. This according to the learned counsel amounts to serious inroad on the right of speech, on the right to profess and practice ones religion and amounts to serious discrimination. The practices for which this minority is being prosecuted have been declared to be religious practices of the minority and permissible both under the Constitution and the law as held in Abdur Rahman Mobashi and 3 others versus Syed Amir Ali Shah Bokhari and 4 others (PLD 1978 Lahore 113), Mu-jibur Rehman and 3 others versus Federal Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1985 Federal Shariat Court 8 at pages 89 and 93). In addition, the learned counsel contended that Enforcement of Shari’ah Act, 1991 (Act X of 1991) permits the non-muslims to practice their religion. He has also drawn our attention to Article 233 of the Constitution to emphasize that Article 20 of the Constitution is one of those provisions of the Constitution which cannot be suspended even during the emergency. On the question as to what is religion, the learned counsel has referred to The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras versus Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 S.C. 282), Ratilal Panachand Gandhi and others versus State of Bombay and others (AIR 1954 S.C. 388) and Ramanasramam by its Secretary G. Sambasiva Rao and others versus The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras (AIR 1961 Madras 265). He has also referred to “Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies in Pakistan by S. Sharifudin Pirzada” - page 319 relating to former Article 10 (Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions), and to Mr. Justice Tanzil-ur Rehman’s view on Article 20 published as “Constitution and the Freedom of Religion” in PLD 1989 Journal 17. He had also referred to “Fundamental Law of Pakistan by A. K. Brohi ” page 317 and to Article “Quaid-e-Azam’s Contribution to the Cause of Human Rights by Mr. Justice Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah” published in PLD 1977 Jounral page 13 paras. 6 and 17 wherein rights enshrined in Article 20 of the Constitution have been dealt with.
The learned counsel has also explained the limited meaning which has been given to the expression “subject of law” used in Article 20 of the Constitution in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury and 58 others versus The Province of East Pakistan and Secretary, Finance and Revenue (Revenue) Department Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 S.C. 9 at page 41), Messrs East and West Steamship Company versus Pakistan (PLD 1958 S.C. 41) and Sarfraz Hussain Bokhari versus District Magistrate, Kasur and others (PU 1983 SC 348). On the question of vagueness the law and the spacious meaning that can be given to the expression “posing as a Muslim”, the learned counsel has referred to Crawford’s “Statutory Construction Interpretation of Statutes”, page 339 S198, Haji Ghulam Zamin and another versus A.B. Khondkar and others (PLD 1965 Dacca 156 at page 180). K.A. Abbas versus The Union of India and another (AIR 1971 S.C. 481, at page 497) and State of Madhya Pradesh and another versus Baldeo Prasad (AIR 1961 S.C. 293).
Finally, the learned counsel has referred to the opinion formed with regard to this law by the International community in the form of reports submitted by the International Committee of Jurists in 1978 (pages 103 to 115) and Amnesty International in 1991. |
10. | Mr. Mujeebur Rahman, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeals has dealt with the interpretation of the provisions of the Ordinance XX of 1984 with a view to exclude the criminal cases that were registered for wearing badges of Kalma Tayyaba. His argument on the subject is that this law had its background in the decision of the Lahore High Court reported as Abdur Rahman Mobashir’s case (PLD 1979 Lahore 1 13). Recital of Kalma Tayyaba or for that matter wearing of the badge of Kalma Tayyaba was considered to be one of permissible practices of the Quadianis and in the law under consideration it has not been expressly excluded. He has invoked, therefore, the principle that express mention of certain practices for making them an offense would certainly incur criminal statute imply necessarily the exclusion of all others not expressly mentioned. In support of this proposition he has referred to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by P.St.J. Langan - page 293 and Crawford’s Statutory construction page 334. Another principle invoked by him is that being a penal statute, a strict construction has to prevail and has to be preferred and for this reliance has been placed on Relmat Aslam versus The Crown (PLD 1952 Lahore 578), Mazhar Ali Khan, Printer & Publisher of the Daily “Imroza” versus The Governor of the Punjab (PLD 1954 Lahore 14). Khizar Hayat and 5 others versus the Commissioner, Sargodha Division and the Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha (PLD 1965 Lahore 349), Qasu and 2 others versus The State (Pld 1969 Lahore 48), Messrs Hirjina and Co. (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi versus Commissioner of Sales Tax Central, Karachi and another (1973 S.C.M.R. 140).
Mr. Mujeebur Rahman, the learned counsel also contended that the word “oath” has to be read in its context and the principle of “Noscitur a Sociis” gets attracted. There cannot be any enlargement of the context, meaning or scope by bringing in what is not mentioned therein. He has interpreted, and applying the principle of “Ejusdam Generis” restricted the operation of the statue to what is expressly mentioned. He considers, what is mentioned after the word “or” is enumerative, illustrative, stipulative exhaustive. On his reasoning the convicts were guilty of no offense in spite of their admitting on the factual plane that they were wearing such badges were Quadianis. |
11. | Mr. Aziz Ahmed Bajwa, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 412 of 1992 in arguing his case mainly confined himself to the provisions of Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 to make out a case that on the strength of Miss Benazir Bhutto versus Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1988 S.C. 416-PLJ 1988 S.C. 306), Fundamental rights could even then be invoked for challenging the vires of the Ordinance XX of 1984 because it could not be in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution which was suspended. The Supreme Court having conceded the limited right to the Martial Law Administrator in Miss Asma Jilani versus The Government of the Punjab and another (PLD 1972 S.C. 139) could not permit his making of such a statute. It was additionally under clause (3) of Article 227 of the Constitution violative of the personal law of the Quadianis. Ordinance XX of 1984, according to the learned counsel, was malicious and on that account not a good law at all in view of the decision of this court in Pakistan, through Secretary, cabinet Division, Islamabad and others versus Nawabzada Muhammed Umar Khan (deceased) now represented by Khawaja Muhammad Khan of Hoti and others (1992 SCMR 2450). |
12. | Syed Riazul Hassan Gilani, Advocate, the learned counsel representing the Federal Government has raised a preliminary objection based on the decisions of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court reported in Mujibur Rahman and 3 others versus Federal Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1985 Federal Shariat Court 8) and Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Wajid and 4 others versus Federal Government of Pakistan (PLD 1988 S.C. 167) respectively. According to him, Ordinance XX of 1984 was directly challenged before the Federal Shariat Court on the ground of its being repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and violative of the Fundamental Rights. The Federal Shariat Court had negatived the contention and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court had, while allowing the withdrawal of the appeal, held that the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court shall remain in the field. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Aziz Begum and others versus Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1990 SC 899) the decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court will hold the field and is not open to examination or review by the Supreme Court otherwise. The only course open was for the appellants to seek a review of that judgment instead of reopening the question decided in that jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the Federal Government has on merits taken us to “Thoughts and Reflections of lqbal” edited with notes by Syed Abdul Wahid from pages 246 to 306 in order to highlight that unity of God and finality of Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) are the two basic concepts of Islam and eroding anyone of them would justify the exclusion of those doing so from the community. This according to the learned counsel justified the constitutional amendment introduced unanimously by clause (3) in Article 260 of the Constitution. On the same principle, the protective measures adopted by Ordinance XX of 1984 will be treated as a mere logical consequence of the constitutional amendment and if the constitutional amendment stands so will all that logically follows from it including the provisions of the Ordinance XX of 1984.
It was further contended by the learned counsel representing the Federal Government that the expression “subject to law” in Article 20 of the Constitution implies necessarily the injunctions of Islam. The Fundamental Rights, therefore, enshrined in Article 20 of the Constitution have to be further controlled and contained by the Injunctions of Islam. Then injunctions on these aspects of the religion being clearly brought out and having been incorporated in Article 260(3) of the Constitution, no such right as is claimed by the appellants, can be allowed to be exercised publicly to the annoyance, detriment and subversion of the Islamic faith. Additionally it is contended that what the Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees is the propagation and preaching of ones own faith and not the subversion and the mutilation of somebody else’s religion. In doing what the appellants have been found to be doing or claiming a right to do, they are only subverting and mutilating the religion of others living in Pakistan and not in fact observing their own religion. It is, according to the learned counsel for the Federal Government, an obligation of the State under Article 31 to preserve, protect and strengthen the Islamic Ideology against every other.
It was also contended that the State power can be exercised to avoid clash of ideologies in the matter of religion and the State can exercise the power of preventing those who are encroaching on it by keeping them within contentment or limits by prohibiting certain parts which are likely to create law and order problem.
Finally the learned counsel for the Federal Government pointed out that what the impugned Ordinance (XX of 1984) accomplishes is all within the ambit of Islamic Injunction. It establishes, and reinforces the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). It protects the prayers and the mosques. It prohibits “Illhaad” or subversion of the religion and it protects against hurting the religious feelings of others in majority. These are all laudable objects recognized by the Injunctions of Islam and permitted by the constitutional provisions in Islamic State. In this background, both on the constitutional plane, on the grounds of public order and morality, the provisions made in impugned Ordinance (XX of 1984) are not violative of any of the rights of the appellants. He also pointed out to the main features of the Ordinance and Article 20 of the Constitution in order to demonstrate that the observance of the ritual by the individual and the protection of the institutions by the religion both were covered by Article 20 and the Ordinance only made that protection concrete, descriptive and certain by Specifications, enumerations and descriptions. |
13. | Mr. Ismail Qureshi, Adovcate, representing the Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nubuwwat Group contended that Article 260(3) of the Constitution having declared the Quadianis as non-Muslim, any attempt to pose as Muslims by them is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and it is that practicing fraud or misdescription which is sought to be controlled by Ordinance XX of 1984. Article 20 confers no absolute right to profess religion but it has to be in conformity with other provisions and public morality. In that context, the impugned Ordinance advances what is provided in clause (3) of Article 260 of the Constitution and recognizes and protects both the religion of the majority as well as of the declared minority. In that context, the proceedings taken under Article 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code were appropriate and justified besides that order under section 144 Cr. P.C. was limited to a period of less than a week and there could be no objection subsisting over it. |
14. | The chronological history of the Constitution Petitions under consideration clearly gives the impression that except for Constitution Petition No. 2089 of 1989 (now Civil Appeal No. 412 of 1992 before us) all other matters related to events taking place in 1984 and early 1985 when the Fundamental Rights were not available for challenging the proceedings. It is for this reason that in the very first matter (Civil Appeal NO. 149 of 1989) the challenge to Ordinance No. XX of 1984 was by reference to the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981. However, the convictions in the criminal cases had taken place in July, 1986 and at that time Fundamental Rights were in full force and could be invoked for avoiding the conviction notwithstanding that the events reported related to a period when the Fundamental Rights were not enforceable. In any case, therefore, these matters are required to be examined and are being examined on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions as contained in the revived Constitution and the Fundamental Rights contained therein. |
15. | So far as Civil Appeal No. 412 of 1992 arising out of Constitution Petition No. 2089 of 1989 is concerned, it related substantially to a transitory matter namely, the order passed under section 144 Cr. P.C. which was passed on 21-3-89 and was to remain in force till 25-3-89. Thereafter an order of the Resident Magistrate was brought under challenge which was passed on 25-3-89 whereunder on the instructions of Assistant Commissioner Chiniot this order of 21-3-89 was given an indefinite extension in time till further orders. Both those orders and the challenge to them find mention in Mirza Khurshid Ahmad and another versus Government of Punjab and others (PLD 1992 Lahore 1 at pages 14 to 16). The justification for the order dated 21-3-89 was gone into. Its validity upheld. As regards the order of the Resident Magistrate, it did not receive that attention which it should have on the legal plane. There is no authority possessed by the Assistant Commissioner, the District Magistrate, the Resident Magistrate or the Home Department of the Government to extend indefinitely till further orders an order passed under section 144 Cr. P.C. This part of the order recorded by the Resident Magistrate referring to an order by the Assistant Commissioner had to be declared as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. None of the counsel appearing at the hearing, not even the Advocate-General, has been able to sustain this order recorded by the Resident Magistrate. Hence, the Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 412 of 1992) is allowed to this extent with no order as to costs. |
16. | Taking up the constitutional provisions relevant to the subject under examination clause (3) of Article 260 of the Constitution is of importance. It is reproduced in extenso as hereunder: -
“In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:-
(a) | “Muslim” means a person on who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be, a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and |
(b) | “non-Mulsim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Budhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes. ” |
Article 20 of the Constitution in the Chapter of Fundamental Rights, which requires pointed attention, is reproduced hereunder:-
“20. Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions - Subject to law, public order and morality:-
(a) | every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and |
(b) | every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.” |
Articles 19 and 25, which have also been referred to for providing strength, meaning and effect to the Fundamental Right contained in Article 20, relate to Freedom of speech, etc. (Article 19) and Equality of citizens before law (Article 25). |
17. | On the basis of Article 2-A of the Constitution having been made a substantive part of our Constitution, an argument was advanced that the other provisions of the Constitution should all be read, interpreted and applied as if they are additionally subordinate to and controlled by injunctions of Islam. Even the Fundamental Rights invoked in these appeals and the others not in issue should also be interpreted as if subordinate to Injunctions of Islam. The further argument thereafter is that as held by the Federal Shariat Court in Majibur Rehamn and 3 others versus Federal Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1985 FSC 8) the Injunctions of Islam clearly prohibit what the appellants are alleged to have done or are doing as a matter of religious ceremony, or practice.
On this reasoning it follows, according to the contenders, that the impugned law is neither violative of any of the constitutional provisions nor of the Fundamental Rights invoked in those cases. |
18. | The effect of introduction of Article 2-A of the Constitution and its becoming a substantive provision of the Constitution has been considered at great length by this court in Hakim Khan and 3 others versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others (PLD 1992 S.C. 595). Its effect on the other constitutional provisions and as a controlling and supervening provision has been considered as per Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, J. (now the Chief Justice) in the following words:
“This rule of interpretation does not appear to have been given effect to in the judgment of the High Court on its view that Article 2A is a supra-Constitutional provision. Because, if this be its true status then the above-quoted clause would require the framing of an entirely new Constitution. And even if Article 2A really meant that after its introduction it is to become in control of the other provisions of the Constitution, then most of the Articles of the existing Constitution will become questionable on the ground of their alleged inconsistency with the provisions of the Objectives Resolution….. Thus, instead of making the 1973 Constitution more purposeful, such an interpretation of Article 2A, namely that it is in control of all the other provisions of the Constitution would result in undermining it and pave the way for its eventual destruction or at least its continuance in its present form….. The role of Objectives Resolution, accordingly in my humble view, notwithstanding the insertion of Article 2A in the Constitution (whereby the said Objectives Resolution has been made a substantive part thereof) has not been fundamentally transformed from the role envisaged for it at the outset; namely that it should serve as beacon light for the Constitution makers and guide them to formulate such provisions for the Constitution which reflect ideals and the objectives set forth therein …. In practical terms, this implies in the changed context, that the impugned provision of the Constitution shall be corrected by suitably amending it through the amendment process laid down in the Constitution itself.” As per Shafiur Rahman, J., it was considered as hereunder:-
“The provisions of Article 2A were never intended at any stage to be self-executory or to be adopted as a test of repugnancy or of contrariety. It was beyond the power of the Court to have applied the test of repugnancy by invoking Article 2A of the Constitution for striking down any other provision of the Constitution (Article 45).” |
19. | Another preliminary legal argument against the case set out by the appellants was that Fundamental Right 20 which was invoked was itself subject to law, and Ordinance No. XX of 1984 qualifies as law for the purposes of Article 20 of the Constitution. Therefore, the impugned provisions thereof will hold good notwithstanding any apparent or substantial conflict with its provisions. This argument or such an argument has been adequately and effectively dealt with by the Supreme Court as early as January, 1956 in Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury and 58 others versus The Province of East Pakistan and Secretary, Finance and Revenue (Revenue) Department, Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 S.C. 9 at page 41) in the following words:-
“There can be no doubt that these drastic provisions of the Act strike religious institutions at their very root, and the question is whether, that being the effect of the provisions, they constitute an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution? In the High Court, Mr. Brohi’s bold categorical assertion that the rights referred to in Article 18 are “Subject to law” and may therefore be taken away by the law, succeeded. That assertion has been repeated before us, but I have not the slightest hesitation in rejecting it. The very conception of a fundamental right is that it being a night guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be taken away by the law, and it is not only technically inartistic but a fraud on the citizens for the makers of a Constitution to say that a right is fundamental but that it may be taken away by the law. I am unable to attribute any such intent to the makers of the Constitution who in their anxiety to regulate the lives of the Muslims of Pakistan in accordance with he Holy Quran and Sunnah could not possibly have intended to empower the legislature to take away from the Muslims the right to profess, practice and propagate their religion and to establish, maintain and manage their religious institutions, and who in their conception of the ideal of a free, tolerant and democratic society could not have denied a similar right to the non-Muslim citizens of the State. If the argument of Mr. Brohi is sound, it would follow, and he admitted that it would, that the legislature may today interdict the profession of Islam by the citizens because the right to profess, practice and propagate religion is under the Article as much subject to law as the right to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions. I refuse to be a party to any such pedantic, technical and narrow construction of the Article in question, for I consider it to be a fundamental canon of construction that a Constitution should receive a liberal interpretation in favor of the citizen, especially with respect to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the freedom of conscience and worship. Consistently, with the language used, constitutional instructions should receive a broader and more liberal construction than statutes, for the power dealt with in the former case is original and unlimited and in the latter case limited, and constitutional rights should not be permitted to be nullified or evaded by astute verbal criticism, without regard to the fundamental aim and object of the instrument and the principles on which it is based. If the language is not explicit, or admits of doubt, it should be presumed that the provision was intended to be in accordance with the acknowledged principles of justice and liberty. Accordingly, in doubtful cases that particular construction should be preferred which does not violate those principles. In the light of these rules of construction of constitutional instruments it seems to me that what Article 18 means is that every citizen has the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion and every sect of a religious denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions, though the law may regulate the manner in which religion is to be professed practiced and propagated and religious institutions are to be established, maintained and managed. The words “the right to establish, subject to law, religious institutions” cannot and do not mean that such institutions may be abolished altogether by the law.” |
20. | Ordinance XX of 1984 which is being examined was promulgated by the President on the 26th of April, 1984 “in pursuance of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf’. In making the Ordinance and promulgating it the then President suffered from no constitutional restraints of Fundamental Rights or other provisions. His will was supreme. The entire Ordinance has not been subjected to scrutiny in these proceedings. The portions which have received pointed attention and challenge relate to section 3 of the Ordinance adding new sections 298-B and 298-C in the Pakistan Penal Code Act (XLV of 1860), and are reproduced hereunder:-
(1) | “298-B. Misuse of Epithets, descriptions and titles, etc. reserved for certain holy personages or places
(a) | Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, – (a) (b) (c) (d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as ‘Masjid’ shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. |
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(2) | Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves “Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as ‘Azan’, or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.” |
(3) | “298-C. Person of Quadiani group. etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or promoting his faith.- Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), “who directly or indirectly,”
(a) | “poses himself as a Muslim”, |
(b) | “or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam”, |
(c) | “or preaches or propagates his faith”, “by words, either spoken or written”, |
(d) | “or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation”, |
(e) | “or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims” |
“shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine”. |
Section 298-C has been broken in clauses in order to make its effect, examination and scrutiny easier. |
21. | This Ordinance XX of 1984 by its section 2 provides that “provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any order or decision of any Court”. This section has its background and reference to the case of Abdur Rahman Mobashir and 3 others versus Syed Amir Ali Shah Bokhari and 4 others (PLD 1978 Lahore 113) where the tenets of Quadiani or Ahmadi faith were examined in great detail with a view to ascertain what rights others could have in challenging them, prohibiting or preventing them or in avoiding them. However, it is not necessary to reproduce the conclusions drawn therein because it stands over-ridden by this Ordinance XX of 1984 and in any case the test is the Fundamental Right, a constitutional provision and not a civil right which was in issue in that case. Nevertheless, it must be stated that it is a very exhaustive and illuminative judgmenton the subject. |
22. | The learned counsel for the appellants has taken exception to the provision (d) and subsection (2) of section 298-B of the PPC as introduced by the Ordinance. It concerns the naming of the place of worship by the Quadianis and Ahmadis is ‘Masjid’ and calling of ‘Azan’. Historically this has been shown in the Lahore High Court case to be a tenet or a practice of Ahmadis or Quadianis not of recent origin or device and adopted not with a view to annoy or outrage the feelings and sentiments of non-Ahmadis and non-Quadianais. Being an essential element of their faith and not being offensive per se, prohibition on the use of these by them and making it an offense punishable with imprisonment and fine violates the Fundamental Right of religious freedom of professing, practicing and propagating and of Fundamental Right of equality in as much as only Quadianis or Ahmadis are prevented from doing so and not other religious minorities. It is not the “Azan” or the naming of the “Masjid” which has been made objectionable by law but doing of these by Ahmadis or Quadianis alone. |
23. | The learned counsel for the appellants has taken strong exception to section 298-C clause (a) of the PPC on the ground that the word “posing” is abominably vague and incapable of judicial enforcement. We are not inclined to agree with him because already in the language of law the words like “fraud”, “misrepresentation”, “deception”, “cheating” which have a wide undefined connotation are in use and have meaning similar to that of “posing”. With the constitutional mandate in the background providing that Ahmadis and Quadianis shall be for the purposes of law and Constitution dealt with in this country as non-Muslim prevents them from giving themselves out as Muslims. Such a provision is in advancement of the constitutional mandate and not in derogation, of it. Therefore, if any Ahmadi or Quadiani claims to be or gives out publicly to be a Muslim, then he would be acting in violation of the constitutional provision contained in Article 260(3). Such a provision could certainly be made within the framework of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights an offense. This argument equally applies to clause (b) as made out above Section 298-C of the PPC. |
24. | As regards clause (e) of Section 298-C, the law cannot be said to be violative of Fundamental Right of religion or speech where it punishes acts outraging the religious feelings of a particular group or of the general public as such. Nobody has a Fundamental Right or can have one of outraging the religious feelings of others while propagating his own religion or faith. Therefore, clauses (a), (b) and (e) as found in section 298-C are consistent with the constitutional provisions contained in Articles 19, 20 and 260(3). |
25. | On the reasoning that has been adopted in interpreting these relevant articles of the Constitution, clauses (c) and (d) of section 298-C of PPC as reproduced above standing by themselves, individually or the two together would be violative of the Fundamental Right of religion’s freedom and of equality and of the speech in so far as they prohibit and penalize only the Ahmadis and Quadianis from preaching or propagating their faith by words written or spoken or by visible representation. Invitation to one’s own faith when it is not accompanied by another objectionable feature cannot be condemned. However, if the acts mentioned in clauses (c) and (d) are accompanied with what is provided in clause (e) or has the effect of clauses (a) and (b) then the act will be penal under these relevant clauses and not under clauses (c) and (d). to this extent clauses (c) and (d) of section 298-C PPC as reproduced in the judgment and as interpreted would be ultra vires the Constitution. |
26. | So far as the five appeals arising out of criminal trial (Criminal Appeals 31-K to 35-K/88) are concerned, we find that three of them have originated in the complaint of Nazir Ahmad Taunsvi directly concerned with the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat movement who made a grievance of the fact that certain persons were roaming about in the Bazar with the badges of ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ exhibited on their chest. They were known to be Quadiani. Some of them on being questioned said that they were Muslim. This act of theirs of wearing a badge of the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ was taken to be their posing as Muslim. This conviction is defective because in view of the discussion and findings already recorded for an Ahmadi to wear a badge having ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ inscribed on it does not per se amount to outraging the feelings of Muslims nor does it amount to his posing as a Muslim. It was admitted and is common knowledge that those who are Muslim do not in order to prove their religion of Islam wear badges of the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’. This is done by those who are constitutionally classified as non-Muslims. Therefore, there should be no element of posing or representation by non-Muslims by wearing the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ as Muslims in the existing situation. |
27. | As regards the allegation that on being questioned and interrogated they gave the reply that they were Muslims while in fact they were Quadiani or Ahmadis, that too will not be an offense under the law. Posing involves voluntary representation. In giving reply to a question one does not respond voluntarily but as would appear from the circumstances of these cases under threat or duress. One may hide his religion in public to protect himself physically preferring the lesser evil of criminal prosecution or one may avoid and give an evasive reply. This conduct will not be reprehensible, particularly when so the person asking the question has no authority in law to ask these questions or to exact a correct reply, nor the statement is being made on oath. The exhibition or use of ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ correctly reproduced, properly and respectfully exhibited cannot be made a ground per se for action against those who use ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ in such a manner. If for ascertaining its peculiar meaning and effect one has to reach the inner recesses of the mind of the man wearing or using it and to his belief for making it an offense then the exercise with regard to belief and the meaning of it for that person and the purpose of using and exhibiting the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ would be beyond the scope of the law and in any case it will infringe directly the religious freedom guaranteed and enjoyed by the citizens under the Constitution, where mere belief unattended by unobjectionable conduct cannot be objected to. |
28. | The other two Criminal appeals (Criminal Appeals No. 32-K and 33-K of 1988) relate to reports lodged by individuals not so connected with any religious movement as such. They felt offended and insulted only because the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ badge was worn by the persons known to be Ahmadi or Quadianis or Lahori. There was no representation by words of mouth or otherwise by those wearing the ‘Kalma Tayyabba’ badges that they were Muslims and not Quadianis or Ahmadis. |
29. | Our difficulty in handling these appeals has been that the respondents have by and large argued the matter as if the vires of the impugned portions of the Ordinance are being tested for their inconsistency more with injunctions of Islam than for their inconsistency with the Fundamental Rights. This has brought in religious scholars volunteering to assist the court generating lot of avoidable heat and controversy at the argument and post argument stage. |
30. | The result of the above discussion is that the Criminal Appeals No. 31-K/1988 to 35-K/1988 are allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellants is set aside. Further, the provisions of clause (d) and subsection (2) of section 298-B and portions (c) and (d) of section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, reproduced in paragraph 20 of the judgment, are declared to be ultra vires the Fundamental Rights 20 and 25. |
31. | Civil Appeals No. 149 and 1989 and 150 of 1989 are also partly allowed to the extent the portions of the Ordinance XX of 1984 have been held to be ultra vires the Fundamental Rights 19, 20 and 25. No order is made as to costs. |
Self-Shafiur Rahman, J.
(singed)
ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY. J:
I have had the benefit of going through the draft judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned brother Shafiur Rahman, J., but with respect, I do not agree with the opinion of my learned brother.
The facts of the connected appeals have been fully enumerated in the proposed judgment and I need not repeat the same. So far as the present appeal is concerned, the facts giving rise to the proceedings are that the appellants belong to Ahmadis community, (Quadianis), a non-Muslim religious sect. The Ahmadis throughout the world had decided to celebrate the centenary of their religion, which was founded on 23rd March, 1889, in a befitting manner, commencing from 23rd March, 1989.
On 20th March, 1989, the Home Secretary, Government of Punjab, promulgated an order, under Section 144, Cr. P.C. banning the centenary celebrations, by the Quadianis in the Province of Punjab. The District Magistrate, Jhang, also passed another order dated 21st March, prohibiting the Quadianis of Jhang District, from undertaking the following activities:
“(I) | Illuminations on buildings and premises; |
(ii) | Erection of decorative gates; |
(iii) | Holding of processions and meetings; |
(iv) | Use of loudspeakers and megaphones; |
(v) | Raising of slogans; |
(vi) | Exhibition of badges; buntings and banners etc.; |
(vii) | Distribution of pamphlets and pasting of postures on the walls and wall writings. |
(viii) | Distribution of sweets and service of food; |
(ix) | Any other activity directly or indirectly which may incite and injure the feelings of Muslims.” |
It appears from the above, that what had been banned are the activities in public or in the view of the public, to save breach of peace and maintain the law and order.
The Resident Magistrate, Rabwah, informed the Ahmadia community to remove ceremonial gates, banners and illuminations and also ensure that no more writings will be done on the walls. He further informed that the prohibitions contained in the order dated 21st March had been extended till further orders.
The appellants challenged the above orders by way of Written Petition No. 2089 of 1989, seeking declaration that their right to recount the important events of the last hundred years of their community and to celebrate the same in a befitting manner could not be denied to them. It was stated that they had planned to do that by wearing new clothes, offering thanksgiving prayers, distributing sweets among children, serving food to the poor and to assemble for meetings, to express their gratitude to God Almighty for favors and bounties bestowed by Him in the last hundred years. They contended that all the activities noted above, being protected and guaranteed by Fundamental Right, as embodied in Article 20 of the Constitution of 1973, the impugned orders were unlawful. it was further stated that none of the ingredients of Section 144 was present to attract the impugned orders. One of the appellants who was also convicted under Section 298-B of PPC, for using a badge of ‘Kalima’ and for saying ‘Azan’ had filed another petition. This section 298-B and another 298-C had been inducted in the PPC, by the Ordinance XX of 1984.
The case came up before a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, who in his judgment considered very concisely the legal and constitutional questions raised in the case and has rendered a very balanced judgment. We highly appreciate that the learned Judge relied, in this respect, on precedents from the jurisdiction, which are either secular or claim to be the champions of human rights. The controversy raised before the Court is, undoubtedly, of very sensitive nature, concerning one’s faith and belief and need a very dispassionate and careful approach, in order to inspire confidence and lend its judgment the necessary independence.
The main question involved is whether the impugned orders passed under Section 144 Cr. P.C. and the Ordinance XX of 1984 are violative of the Fundamental Right (Art. 20) as given in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.
The appellants raised the following propositions for consideration:
“(a) | The finding of the Federal Shariat Court that the Ordinance is not contrary to Quran and Sunnah, is of no consequence, so far as this Court is concerned. |
(b) | The Ordinance expressly and in no uncertain terms, is total denial of religious freedom guaranteed under Article 20 of the Constitution to the Ahmadi citizens of Pakistan. |
(c) | The Ordinance is vague and uncertain and also oppressive. |
(d) | That the word ‘law’ used in phrase ‘subject to law’ in Article 20 means positive law and not Islamic Law. |
(e) | The phrase ‘glory of Islam’ as used in Article 19 of the Constitution cannot be availed in respect of the rights conferred in Article 20. |
(f) | Use of a badge of ‘Kalima’ and saying ‘Azan’ are not covered by the Ordinance. |
(g) | The impugned orders issued under Section 144, Cr.P.C., violate the appellants’ fundamental rights about religion and are, therefore, violative of Article 20 of the Constitution. |
Before proceeding with the contentions as raised, it appears necessary to say, if the general law applied so far, gives everyone a right to the use of any word, name, and epithet etc., or, do there exist any recognized restrictions already? It will be appreciated that some of the epithets, descriptions and titles etc., as given in Section 298B have been used by Quran for specific personages (See 33; 32, 33:54 and 9: 100) while others undoubtedly and rather admittedly being used by the Muslims, for those mentioned there, exclusively for last about 1400 years. These epithets carry special meaning, are part of the Muslim belief and used for reverence. Any person using them for others, in the same manner, may be conveying impression to others that they are concerned with Islam when the fact may be otherwise.
It is to be noted that it is not only in Pakistan but throughout the world, that laws protect the use of words and phrases which have special connotations or meaning and which if used for other may amount to deceiving or misleading the people. The English Company Law lays down that a name must not be misleading or suggest a connection with the Crown, a Government Department, or a municipality, and only in exceptional circumstances will names be allowed which include “Imperial”, “Commonwealth”, “National”, or “International”. The use of word’s “Cooperative” and “Building Society” is also forbidden. The most important is the rule that the name will be refused registration if it is too like the name of an existing company. These provisions have been strictly applied and were never challenged in a Court of law or the Parliament.
Section 20 of the Indian Company Law also lays down that no company shall be registered by a name which, in the opinion of the Central Government, is undesirable and that a name which is identical with, or too nearly resembles, the name by which a company in existence has been previously registered, will be deemed to be undesirable by the Central Government. The Indian Constitution has similar Fundamental Rights as ours but we have not seen a single decision of any court there, declaring the restrictions violative of these rights.
A law for protection of trade and merchandise marks exists, practically, in every legal system of the world to protect the trade names and marks etc. with the result that no registered trade name or mark of one firm or company can be used by any other cancers and a violation thereof, not only entitles the owner of the trade name or mark to receive damages from the violator but it is a criminal offense also.
Here we may refer to English Law. It was held in J. Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Company Ltd. {1959} 3 W.L.R. 966] that “An injunction could be obtained to restrain the defendant from continuing a practice that was calculated to deceive, although there was no proof of an intent to deceive”.
The Chapter X of the Trade and Merchandise Mars Act, 1958, of India provides penalties for falsifying and falsely applying trade marks or for applying false trade marks, trade descriptions, etc., or for selling goods to which a false trademark or false description is applied.
The Chapter VXIII of the Indian and Pakistan Penal Codes, contains offenses relating to documents and to trade and property marks. Section 481 says “Whoever, marks any moveable property or goods or any, package or other receptacle containing movable property or goods, or uses any case, package or other receptacle having any trade mark thereon, in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to be believed that the property or goods so marked or any property or goods contained in any receptacle so marked, belong to a person to whom they do not belong is said to use a false property mark. The offense is a fraud and is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both.
Laws similar to above have been in force in Pakistan, and no one challenged them on any ground. We may here refer to section 69 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, which was applicable to the subcontinent of India. The amended section as now applicable in Pakistan is as under:
“69. Restraint of use of Royal Arms and State emblems: If a person, without due authority, uses in connection with any trade, business, calling or profession –
(a) | the Royal Arms or Government Arms (or arms to closely resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive) in such manner as to be calculated to lead to the belief that he is duly authorized so to use the Royal Arms or Government Arms, or |
(b) | name, title and semblance of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah and any variations thereof or any device, emblem or title in such manner as to be calculated to lead to the belief that he is employed by, or supplies goods to, or is connected with, His Majesty’s Government or the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or any department of any such Government, or |
(c) | the emblem, the official seal and the name or any abbreviation of the name of the United Nations or any subsidiary body set up by the United Nations or of the World Health Organization in such manner as is to be calculated to lead to the belief that he is duly authorized by the Secretary-General in the case of the United Nations or by the Director-General of the World Health Organization in the case of that Organization to use that emblem, seal or name,he may, at the suit of any person who is authorized to use such Arms or such device, emblem or title or of the Registrar, be restrained by injunction from continuing so to use the same. |
Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the right, if any, of the proprietor of a trademark containing any such Arms, device, emblem or title to continue to sue such trade mark.” It is thus clear that intentionally using trade names, trade marks, property marks or descriptions of others in order to make believe others that they belong to the user thereof amounts to an offense and not only the perpetrator can be imprisoned and fined but damages can be recovered and injunction to restrain him issued. This is true of goods of even very small value. For example, the Coca Cola Company will not permit anyone to sell, even a few ounces of his own product in his own bottles or other receptacles, marked Coca Cola, even though its price may be a few cents. Further, it is a criminal offense carrying sentences of imprisonment and also fine. The principles involved are: do not deceive and do not violate the property rights of others.
Generally speaking, the people who are deceiving others with falsified names are being discouraged, even though the loss may be in terms of pennies. In our case, a law has been made to protect even the title an of Quaid-e-Azam, without any challenge from any quarter. However, in this Ideological State, the appellants, who are non-Muslims want to pass off their faith as Islam? It must be appreciated that in this part of the world, faith is still the most precious thing to a Muslim believer, and he will not tolerate a government which is not prepared to save him of such deceptions or forgeries.
The appellants, on the other hand, insist not only for a license to pass off their faith as Islam but they also want to attach the exclusive epithets and descriptions etc., of the very revered Muslim personages to those heretic non-Muslims, who are considered not even a patch on them. In fact the Muslim treat it as defiling and desecration of those personages. Thus, the insistence on the part of the appellants and their community to use the prohibited epithets and the ‘Shaa’ire Islam leave no manner of doubt, even to a common man, that the appellants want to do so intentionally and it may, in that case amount to not only defiling those pious personages but deceiving others. And, if a religious community insists on deception as its fundamental right and wants assistance of courts in doing the same, then God help it. It has been held by the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell vs. Connecticut (310 U - S - 296 at 306) that “the cloak of religion or religious belief does not protect anybody in committing fraud upon the public”.
Again, if the appellants or their community have no designs to deceive, why do not they coin their own epithets etc.? Do they not realize that relying on the ‘Shaairs’ and other exclusive signs, marks and practices of other religions will betray the hollowness of their own religion? It may mean in that even that their new religion cannot progress or expand on its own strength, worth and merit but has to rely on deception? After all there are many other religions in the world and none of them ever usurped the epithets etc., of Muslims or others. Rather, they profess and present their own beliefs proudly and eulogize their heroes their own way. I must, however, be mentioned here that there is no law in Pakistan which forbids Ahmadis to coin their own epithets. etc. and use them sort, whatever, against their religion.
It was argued that the finding of the Federal Shariat Court that the Ordinance is not contrary to Quran and Sunnah is of no consequence, so far as this Court is concerned.
The contention, however, has no merit. The Ahmadis have been declared non-Muslims by Article 260(3)(b) of the Constitution. This fact has further been affirmed by the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan, in Mujibur Rehman vs. Federal Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1985 FSC 8), for the reason that the Ahmadia do not believe in the finality of prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him); they falsify a clear and general verse of Holy Quran by resort to its “Taweel“; and import into Islam, heretic concepts like shadowism, incarnation and transmigration.
They were, therefore, asked to restrain themselves from directly or indirectly posing as Muslims or claiming legal rights of Muslims.
The Federal Shariat court further held that the word “Sahabi” and “ahle-baith” are used by Muslims for companions and members of the family of Holy Prophet respectively, all of whom were the best Muslims. The Court observed that use of such epithets, which are exclusive for companions of Prophet, his wives and members of his family, by Quadianis in respect of the wives, members of the family, companions and successors of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, amounts to defiling them and may deceive people that the bearers of such epithets are good Muslims. It was further stated that calling of ‘Azan’ and naming place of worship as ‘Masjid’ is considered a sure sign of the person calling ‘Azan’ or of persons congregating or praying in the mosque as being Muslims. It was thus held that the provisions of the Ordinance banning use of these epithets, expressions and preaching of religion, by the Ahmadis and the reiteration in the Ordinance that the Ahmadis cannot call themselves or pose to be Muslims in any manner directly or indirectly is in implementation of the constitutional objective.
As regards ‘Shaa’ir of Islam’ (distinctive characteristics), the Court held that Islamic Charia does not allow a non-Muslim to adopt them and if an Islamic State, in spite of its being in power, allows a non-Muslim to adopt them (without embracing Islam), it will be its failure to discharge its duties. An Islamic state, like a secular state, thus has the power to legislate, to prevent non-Muslims from adopting Shaa’ire’ Islam, to propagate their own beliefs. As said above, such restriction will be meant to prevent unscrupulous and fraudulent non-Muslim from using the effective and attractive features of Islam in order to attract other non-Muslims not to Islam but to their own heretic fold. It was further held that claim could not be allowed to be pressed on the basis of the Fundamental rights.
It is to be noted that Mujibur Rehman and others had challenged the above order of the Federal Shariat court in the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court (See: PLD 1988 S.C. (Shariat Appellate Bench) 167), under Article 203F of the Constitution but withdraw it later for the reasons best known to the appellants. This Court in that appeal held as under:
“Judgment of the Federal Shariat Court shall rule the field”. The present appeal has been filed and is being heard on the general side, under Art. 185 of the constitution.
The Chapter 3A of the Constitution was inducted in the Constitution on 26th May, 1980. It contains Articles 203A to Article 203J. The Article 203A of the Constitution lays down that the provisions of Chapter 3A shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. Further Article 203G provides that “Save as provided in Article 203F, no court or tribunal, including the Supreme Court and a High Court, shall entertain any proceedings or exercise any power or jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the power or jurisdiction of the Court.”
These provisions when read together, would mean that a finding of the Federal Shariat Court, if the same is either not challenged in the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme court or challenged but maintained, would be binding even on the Supreme Court. Consequently, the above given findings of the Federal Shariat Court cannot be ignored by this Court.
The next point needing consideration is whether Ordinance XX of 1984, expressly and is no uncertain terms, is total denial of religious freedom guaranteed under Article 20 of the Constitution to the Ahmadi citizens of Pakistan? In order to appreciate further the contention it is necessary to know the relevant law and the facts which mean to have denied the guaranteed religious freedom to the appellants’ sect.
Section 298B which is relevant to this case, reads as under:
“298B - Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles etc., reserved for certain personages or places. (i) Any person of Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves “Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation,
(a) | refers to or addresses, any person, other than Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as “Amirul Mumineen”, ‘Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen’, Sahaabi’, or ‘Razi Allah Anho’; |
(b) | refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as Ummul Mumineen’; |
(c) | refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-Baith) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as Ahle-Baith; or |
(d) | refers to, or names, or calls his place of worship as ‘Masjid’; |
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
2. Any person of the Quadiani or Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to the prayers followed by his faith as ‘Azan’, or recites ‘Azan’ as used by Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine”.
Section 298C reads as under:
“Person of Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. Any person of Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine”. The contents of the Ordinance XX of 1984 have been reproduced above. They prohibit the community of the appellants to use certain epithets, descriptions and titles etc., mentioned therein. It may be mentioned that Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, the learned counsel, did not challenge the validity of sub-section (a) of Section 298. the orders of the Home Secretary, the District Magistrate and the Resident Magistrate mentioned in the beginning of the petition banned their centenary celebrations, in the Province of Punjab, prohibiting them from the activities reproduced in Para. 3 above and asked them to remove ceremonial gates, banners and illuminations and further ensure that no further writings will be done on the walls. The purpose of the order has also been spelt out in the last direction to say, that no other activity which may directly or indirectly incite and injure the feelings of Muslims, shall be undertaken. The above restrictions, clearly mean such activities which might have been performed in the public or in public view and not those to be performed in private. The actions had been challenged in the High Court through Written Petitions, pleading violation of fundamental rights. The facts which were given by the appellants themselves and on which the orders were passed, will, therefore, be considered as undisputed.
Article 20 provides as hereinunder:
“Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions. Subject to law, public order and morality
(a) | every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and |
(b) | every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.” |
The fundamental right, relevant hence, is the ‘freedom to profess religion’ but it has been made ‘subject to law, public order and morality’. The courts of other countries, which have similar fundamental rights, have held that this right embraces two concepts; freedom to believe and freedom to act. Some of them held the former to be absolute but others said that, that too was subject to law etc. However, all are agreed that the latter, in the nature of things, cannot be absolute. According to them, conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of the society. So the freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. The phrase ‘subject to law’, on the other hand, does neither invest the legislature with unlimited power to unduly restrict or take away the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution, nor can they be completely ignored or by-passed as non-existent. A balance has thus to be struck between the two, by resorting to a reasonable interpretation, keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of each case, (See Jesse Cantwell etc. vs. State of Connecticut, 310 US 296) and Tikamdas and others vs. Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, Karachi, PLD 1968 Kar 703 (F. B.)
The Supreme Court of America in the case of Reynolds vs. United States, (98 US 145) held that “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order …. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.”
After taking the above view, the Supreme Court felt justified to ban polygamy, as it was being practiced by Mormons sect on the ground that it was a duty imposed on them by their religion and was not a religious belief or opinion. It must be noted here that the observations in the last part of the above paragraph are peculiar to America where the people and not Allah are the sovereign.
The Supreme Court of India, in the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra etc. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 at p. 291) approved the view similar to the above, and as taken by Latham CJ in the case from Australia, to say that:
“The provision for protection of religion was not an absolute protection to be interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of the Constitution. These privileges must be reconciled with the right of the State to employ the sovereign power to ensure peace, security and orderly living without which constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a mockery”. It has been observed at page 127 as under:
“In the United States the problems created by this provision have been solved in large measure by holding that the provision for the protection of religious is not an absolute, to be interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court said in Jones v. Opelika (1942) 316 U.S. 584 at p. 593, with reference to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of religion: “They are not absolutes to be exercised independently of other cherished privileges, protected by the same organic instrument. ” It was held that these privileges must be reconciled with the right of a State to employ the sovereign power to ensure orderly living “without which constitutional guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery.” It has been further observed at page 130 as follows:
“The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, that the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.” Again at page 131, it has been observed as hereunder:
“John Stuart Mill in his Essay on Liberty critically examines the idea of liberty, and his discussion of the subject is widely accepted as a weighty exposition of principle. The author had to make the distinction which is often made in words between liberty and license, but which it is sometimes very difficult to apply in practice. He recognized that liberty did not mean the license of individuals to do just what they pleased, because such liberty would mean the absence of law and of order, and ultimately the destruction of liberty. He expressed his opinion as to the limits of liberty when he said: “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their member, is self-protection. ” At the same page it has been further observed that:
“It is consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued existence of the community.” The above observations were made while interpreting Section 116 of the Constitution which reads as follows:
“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.” At page 155 of the aforesaid case, the following observations are relevant:
“The constitutional provision does not protect unsocial actions or actions subversive of the community itself. Consequently the liberty and freedom of religion guaranteed and protected by the Constitution is subject to limitations which it is the function and the duty of the courts of law to expound. And those limitations are such as are reasonably necessary for the protection of the community and in the interests of social order.” It may, therefore, be necessary to know, what is religion, the freedom of which restricts the right of the Governments to legislate and take action. Scholars give different origins of the word. Religion is a complex of doctrines and practices and institutions. It is a statement of belief in God, in a world of spirits and a world or worlds that lie beyond the one in which we live. In its more colloquial sense, a religion is spoken of as a religion, e. g., Christianity or Islam, the religion of Jews or Catholics etc. In Davies vs. Beason (1 890 {133} US 333), the American Supreme Court defined it as under:
“The term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s view of his relation to his creator and the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His will. It is often confounded with cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.” The term is not expressly, defined in the Constitution of Pakistan as such but its meaning may be gathered from the definitions of ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’, in its Article 260(3)(a) and (b), which are as under:
“260(3). In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:
(a) | “Muslim” means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified Prophethood of Muhammed (peace be upon him), the last of prophets and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in the sense of the word or any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and |
(b) | “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Budhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes”. |
There is no definition of the term ‘religion’, in the Constitutions of India or America or Australia either. However, the Indian Supreme Court, in the case of Commissioner H.R.E. vs. Lakshmindra Swamiar (AIR 1954 S.C. 282), interpreted the term in the following manner:
“Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Budhism and Jainism which do not believe in God. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion is conductive to their spiritual well being, but it will not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine of belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and mode of worship which are regarded as integral parts of the religion, and these forms and observance might even extend to matters of food and dress.” The Supreme Court went on to say, in para. 19 of the Judgment that:
“In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of Hindu prescribe that offering of food be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of the sacred texts or obligations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of the religion and mere fact that they are expenditure of money … should not make them secular… ” The Court, after noting that the American and Australian Courts have declared in unrestricted terms, without any limitation whatsoever, the freedom of religion, observed that:
“the language of Articles 25 and 26 is sufficiently clear to enable us to determine without the aid of foreign authorities as to what matters come within the purview of religion and what not. As we have already indicated, freedom of religion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs only; it extends to religious practices as well subject to restrictions which the Constitution itself has laid down”. The Court then did go into the question whether certain matters appertained to religion and concluded by saying that:
“these are certainly not matters of religion and the objection raised with regard to validity of these provisions seem to be altogether baseless.” The same Court in Durghah Committee v. Hussain Ali (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402) is para. 33, Gajendragadkar, J. Struck a note of caution and observed as under:
“Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of place to strike a note of caution and observe that in order that the practice in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even secular practices which are not an essential and integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and make a claim for being treated as religious practices. Similarly, even practices though religious may have spring from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretion to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection may have to be carefully scrutinized; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral part of it and no other. ” The same Court in Jagdishwaranand v. Police Commissioner, Calcutta (AIR 1984 S.C. 51) in para. 10, held as follows:
“Courts have the power to determine whether a particular rite or observance is regarded as essential by the tenets of a particular religion”. It has been seen above, in the judgments of foreign secular courts that though religious practices are protected by the term ‘freedom of religion’ yet only such practices are so covered as are integral and essential part of the religion. It is further held that it is for the courts to determine whether a particular practice, constitutes essential and integral part of the religion or not? In that view of the matter, these practices have to be stated and proved so, from the authentic sources, of the religion, to the satisfaction of the court.
The appellants, therefore, had to first enumerate the practices they intended to perform at the centenary celebrations and then show that they were essential and integral part of their religion, before the court could declare that they, as essential and integral part, were unlawfully denied by the impugned law or the executive orders? The appellants, however, have not explained how the epithets etc., and the various planned ceremonies are essential part of their religion and that they have to be performed only in public or in the public view, on the roads and streets or at the public places?
It will also be noted that if the impugned law is a valid piece of legislation, and the respondents had taken the impugned actions, in the interest of law and order, then unless it can be shown that the same were taken malfide or without factual justification, the question of denial of fundamental rights may not arise. The law on the point has been well settled in various jurisdictions and it may be useful to cite them.
Latham C.J. in Jehovah’s Witnesses case, Adelside vs. Commonwealth, referred to above, while dealing with the provisions of Section 116 of the Australian Constitution, which inter alia forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit “the free exercise of any religion” made the following observations:
“1) | Section 1 16 protects the religion (or absence of religion) of minorities, and, in particular, of unpopular minorities (p. 124) although it is true that in determining what is religious and what is not religious the current application of word religion must necessarily be taken into account. |
2) | Section 1 16 protects practices as well as beliefs (p. 124). |
3) | As to free exercise of religion; the word ‘free’ does not mean license. The concept of freedom can only be evaluated in a particular context. For example free speech does not mean the right to create a panic by calling out “fire” in a crowded theater. Likewise, as various American cases show, the free exercise of religion does not empower individuals because of their religious beliefs to break the law of the country. |
4) | The High Court is arbiter of the occasion when a legislative provision unduly infringes religious freedom. This makes it possible to accord a real measure of practical protection to religion without involving the community in anarchy. |
Consequently, the court held that the doctrine expressed by Jehovah’s Witnesses as to the non-cooperation with the Commonwealth in terms of military obligation was prejudicial to the defense of the community and Section 116 did not give immunity to it. So the rule laid down there is that a law imposing civic duties could not be characterized as a law infringing religious freedom.
Justice Huges in Willis Cox. v. New Hampshire (1941 (312) US 569) also enlightened the same subject to say:
“A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities, does not constitute an unconstitutional interference with religious worship or the practice of religion, as applied to a group marching along a sidewalk in single file carrying signs and playcards advertising their religious beliefs.” We have referred to the above view from such countries, which claim to be the secular and liberal, and not religious or fundamentalists. The same principles were applied by the Indian Supreme Court in Muhammad Hanif Qureshi and others vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1958 S.C. 73 1) to hold that certain laws banning slaughter of certain animals, did not violate the fundamental rights of Muslims under Article 25(l), as there was no material to substantiate the claim that the sacrifice of a cow on Bakr-ld-Day, was enjoined or sanctioned by Islam, to exhibit a Mussalman’s belief and idea.
The same Court in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhutta etc. vs. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, (AIR 1984 S.C. 51) held as follows:
“Even conceding that tandava dance has been prescribed as a religious right for every follower of Anada Marg it does not follow as a necessary corollary that tandava dance to be performed in the public is a matter of religious rite. Consequently, the claim that the petitioner has a fundamental right within the meaning of Article 25 or 26 to perform tandaya dance in public streets and public places is liable to be rejected.” The American Court held in the following cases that there was no violation of constitutional guarantee of freedom of exercise of religion. Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada in his book “Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies in Pakistan” (1966 Edition) at pp. 313-314 and 317 has observed as follows:
“(i) | In Hamilton vs. Board of Regents of University of Califomia, (1934) 293 US 245, where students appealed to the Supreme Court that the act of the university to make a regulation for compulsory military training was contrary to their religious belief, the court rejected the contention, holding that the “Government owes a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and assure the enforcement of law. And every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to support and defend the Government against all enemies.” |
(ii) | The plea of fundamental right was rejected in Commonwealth vs. Plaisted {(1889) 148 Mass. 375}, by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in a case where law prohibits the use of streets for religious meetings, or the beating of drums though it is a part of religious ceremony of such organization as the salvation army. |
(iii) | Where the statute requires a parent to provide medical treatment for a child suffering from disease even if not in accordance with religious belief of the parents. |
(iv) | Freedom of religion does not necessarily imply absolute equality of treatment, and in fact regard must be had to the special position of Church of England. (“The United Kingdom” by G.W. Keeton and D. Lloyd, pp. 67-68). |
The above views, as they are prevalent, in the above jurisdiction, do go to show that freedom of religion would not be allowed to interfere with the law and order or public peace and tranquillity. It is based on the principle that the state will not permit anyone to violate or take away the fundamental rights of others, in the enjoyment of his own rights and that no one can be allowed to insult, damage or defile the religion of any other class or outrage their religious feelings, so as to give rise to law and order situation. So whenever or wherever the state has reasons to believe, that the peace and order will be disturbed or the religious feelings of others may be injured, so as to create law and order situation, it may take such minimum preventive measures as will ensure law and order.
The Muslim think that the birth of this Ahmadia community during the English rule, in the sub-continent, among the Muslim society, was a serious and organized attack on its ideological frontiers. They consider it a permanent threat to their integrity and solidarity, because the socio-political organization of the Muslim society is based on its religion. In that situation their using the above given epithets etc., in a manner which to the Muslim mind looks like a deliberate and calculated act of defiling and description of their holy personages, in a threat to the integrity of ‘Ummah’ and tranquillity of the nation, and it is also bound to give rise to a serious law and order situation, like it happened many a time in the past.
Allama lqbal says,
“I became suspicious of the Quadiani movement when the claim of new prophethood, superior even to the prophethood of the Founder of Islam, was definitely put forward, and Muslim world was declared ‘Kafir’ (infidel). Later, my suspicion developed into a positive revolt when I heard with my own ears an adherent of the movement mentioning the Holy Prophet of Islam in a disparaging language”. (See Thoughts and Reflection of Iqbal, page 297-1973 Edition). As a matter of fact, the Ahmadis, internally, had declared themselves the real Muslim community, by alienating and excommunicating the main body of Muslims, on the ground that as they did not accept Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the prophet and the promised Messiah, they were infidels. The beliefs are held under the instructions of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself, who had declared:
a) | “Every Muslim loves my books, benefits from the contents thereof and accepts them except those who are offspring of whores and prostitutes and whose hearts have been sealed.” (Aainae Kamalaat, pages 547 and 548) One may note the language of a “prophet” and the effect it can have on the addressees. |
b) | There are many more examples of the language like the above but just one more may suffice for the present: “My enemies are swines and their women are worse than bitches.” (Naj mul Huda by Ghulam Ahmad, page 10). |
c) | Quoting Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, his second caliph, Mirza Rashiruddin Ahmad (also his son), in his address to the students, as reported in Alfazel, 30th July, 1931, advised them as to their relationship with the main body of Muslims, as under: “This discussion has been going on since the days of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad whether the Ahmadis should have their permanent places of theological learning or not. One view was against it. Their argument was that the few differences between the Ahmadis and Muslims had been resolved by Hazrat Sahib and he has taught the reasons also. As regards the others they can be learned in the other schools. The other view was for it. Then Mirza Sahib came to clarifies that it was incorrect to say that the differences of Ahmadis with the Muslims were only about the death of Jesus Christ and some other issues. According to him, the differences encompassed the entity of Almighty Allah, the person of the Holy Prophet, Quran, Prayers, Fasting, Pilgrimage and Zakat. He then explained every item in detail.” |
d) | “It has been revealed to me by Allah that any one who does not follow you, does not covenant his allegiance to you and rather opposes you, he is a rebel of Allah and his prophet and shall be entrusted to the fire of Hell.” (Advertisement in Meyarul Akhyar - from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani, page 8). |
e) | Addressing his followers Mirza Sahib stated: “Remember, that Allah has informed me that it is prohibited for you, to offer prayers in the leadership of the ones who deny me, believe me or reject me. Rather, your leader in prayers should be one from amongst you.” (Arbaeen No. 3 page 28 footnote). |
f) | “Now it is clear and it has been repeatedly said in revelations about me that I have been sent by Allah, ordained by Allah, am a delegate of Allah, have come from Allah and you have to believe whatever I say otherwise you will go to Hell.” (Anjame Atham by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani, page 62). |
g) | “Those who are my opponents have been included in the list of Christians, Jews and infidels.” (Nazoolul Masih, Quadian, 1909). |
h) | “One who does not believe in me does not believe in Allah and the Holy Prophet, as their prophesy about me is there.” (Haqiqatul Wahi, 1906, page 163-64). |
i) | When somebody is said to have asked Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as to what is the harm to offer prayers in the leadership of those who did not consider him infidel, he in a long reply concluded that “a long advertisement be published by such leaders of prayers, about those declaring me an infidel and then I shall consider them a Muslim so that you follow them in prayers…” (Badar, 24th May, 1098, as recorded in Majmua Fataava Ahmadia, Vol. 1, page 307). |
j) | “Almighty Allah has revealed to me that any one who received my message and has not believed in me is an infidel. ” (See the letter of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to Dr. Abdul Rahim Khan Patialvi, Haqiqatul Wahi page 163). |
k) | “One who mischievously repeats that Mirza Sahib’s prophesies about the death of Atham were incorrect and that the Christians won the debate and instead of acting justly and fairly, and accepting my victory, raises allegations, he shall be considered to be fond of being known as the illegitimate and not a legitimate issue.” (Anwarul Islam, by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, page 30). |
There are scores of other similar writings, not only by Mirza Sahib himself but his so called ‘calipha’ and followers proving, without any shadow of doubt, that they are religiously and socially, a community separate and different from the Muslims.
Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, who was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had refused to join the congregation, offering prayers, to pay last homage to the departed soul of Quaid-e-Azam, the father of the Nation, by saying that he may be considered as a Muslim Foreign Minister of a non-Muslim State or a non-Muslim Foreign Minister of a Muslim State (Daily Zamindar, Lahore, Feb. 8, 1950).
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had forbidden his followers from marrying their daughters with non-Ahmadis and from praying along with them. According to him the main body of the Muslims could, at the most, be treated like Christians.
In fact Mirza Bashiruudin Ahmad, the second caliph and son of Mirza Sahib, is reported to have said:
“that through an emissary, I requested an English Officer that our separate rights be determined like those of the Parsees and Christians. The officer replied that they are minorities while you are in religious sect. On that I said that even Parsees and Christians are religious communities and if they can be given separate rights why not we.” (Alfazal Nov. 13, 1946). It is thus clear that according to Ahmadis themselves, both the section i.e., Ahmadis and the main body cannot be Muslims at the same time. If one is Muslim, the other is not. Further, the Ahmadis always wanted to be a separate entity and claim a status, distinct and separate from the others. The main body of Muslims also never wanted to stand with Ahmadis on the same pedestal. Way back, as reported above, the Ahmadis were prepared even to be treated as a minority with separate and distinct rights. They, as a religious community are, rather opposed to Muslims and have always endeavored not to mix with them. In fact they declared the whole Muslim ‘Ummah’ as infidels, as said above. However, they being an insignificant minority could not impose their will. On the other hand, the main body of Muslims, who had been waging a campaign against their (Ahmadis’) religion, since its inception, made a decision in 1974, and declared them instead, a non-Muslim minority, under the Constitution itself. As seen above, it was not something sudden, new and undesirable but one of their own choice; only the sides were changed. The Ahmadis are, therefore, non-Muslims; legally and constitutionally and are, of their own choice, a minority opposed to Muslims. Consequently, they have no right to use the epithets etc., and the ‘Shaa’ire Islam, which are exclusive to Muslims and they have been rightly denied their use by law.
As given above, the Constitution of Pakistan declares Ahmadis non-Muslims.. Undoubtedly, they are an insignificant minority, and have, because of their belief, been considered heretic and so non-Muslim, by the main body of Muslims. Apart from what has been said above, the right to oust dissidents has been recognized, in favor of the main body of a religion or a denomination, by the courts, and a law prohibiting such an action was declared ultra vires of the fundamental rights, by the Indian Supreme Court. Reference be made to the case of Sardar Syena Taher Saifudin Sahib vs. State of Bombay etc. (AIR 1962 S.C. 853), where it was also held in para. 40 as under:
“What appears, however, to be clear is that where an excommunication is itself based on religious grounds such as lapse from the orthodox religious creed or doctrine (similar to what is considered as hearsay, apostasy or schism under the Canon Law) or breach of some practice considered as essential part of the religious by the Dawoodi Bohras in general excommunication cannot but held to be essential part of the religion for the purpose of maintaining the strength of the religion. It necessarily follows that the exercise of this power of excommunication on religious grounds forms part of the management by the community through its religious head, ‘of its own affairs in the matter of religion’. The impugned Act makes even such excommunication and takes away the power of the ‘Dni’ as head of the community to excommunicate even on religious grounds. It therefore clearly interfere with the right of Dawoodi Bohra community under cl. (b) of Art. 26 of the Constitution.”
“(41) That excommunication of the member of a community will affect many of his civil rights is undoubtedly true. This particular religious denomination is possessed of properties and the necessary consequence of excommunication will be that the excommunicated member will lose his right of enjoyment of such property. It might be though undesirable that the head of the religious community would have the power to take away in this manner the civil rights of any person. The right given under Art. 26(b) has not, however, been made subject to preservation of Civil rights. The express limitation in Art. 26 itself is that this right under the several clauses of the article will exist, subject to public order, morality and health. It has been held by this Court in 1958 SCMR 895; (AIR 1958 SC 255) that the right under Art. 26(b) is subject further to Cl. 2 of Art. 25 of the Constitution.” Even the Privy Council approved similar power of the main body of a religion in Hassan Ali and others v. Mansoon Ali and others (AIR 1948 PO 66) at para. 53. The following observations of their Lordships may be with advantage:
“The next question in whether the Dai-ul-Mutlao has the power of excommunication. It was undoubtedly exercised by Muhammad and the Imams. The grounds and effects of its exercise will later be considered. At the moment it is only necessary to say that there are instances of its exercise in the community from time to time by the Dais.” As said above, the Ahmadis, also always wanted to be a separate entity, of their own choice, religiously and socially. Normally, they should have been pleased on achieving their objective, particularly. When it was secured for them by the Constitution itself. Their disappointment is that they wanted to oust the rest of the Muslims as infidels and retain the tag of Muslims. Their grievance thus is that they have been excommunicated and branded as non-Muslims, unjustly. The reason of their frustration and dismay may be that now, probably, they cannot operate successfully, their scheme of conversion, of the unwary and non-Muslims, to their faith. Maybe, it is for this reason that they want to usurp the Muslim epithets, descriptions etc. and display ‘Kalima’ and say ‘Azan’ so as to pose as Muslims and preach and propagate in the garb of Muslims with attractive tenets of Islam. The label of non-Muslim seems to have become counter productive.
The urge by the Ahmadis to somehow retain, all the perceivable signs of Muslims seems necessitated to pass off their religion with the dubious stance and the message, as Islam and for that matter their defiance of the Ordinance is quite understandable. The Constitution, however, is in their way, as the Ordinance only fulfills its intent and object. In that event, claiming, propounding, pretending or holding out for a Quadiani that he is Muslim, without first denouncing his faith, is not only a clear violation of the Ordinance but also the Constitution. Events like that have been and may also be occurring in future, and be responsible for grave law and order situation, like the past.
The contention that the impugned Ordinance is vague and oppressive has not even been supported by the appellants. It may be useful to reproduce section 298-C again for ready reference:
Section 298-C reads as under:
“Person of Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith.
8 Any person of Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly poses himself a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept to his faith, by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages, the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” The objection is taken specifically to the phrase “…poses himself a Muslim…his faith as Islam…”. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘vague’ means indefinite; uncertain; not susceptible of being understood. Under this principle a law which does not inform a person of what is commended or prohibited is unconstitutional, being violative of the ‘due process’. The judgments from Indian jurisdiction and Ghulam Zamir v. A.B. Khondkar (P.L.#. 1965 S.C. 156), cited by the appellants, also have no bearing on the case. It is argued that the phrase “who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam…” is too broad and wide, and too undetermined and volatile and too indefinite and uncertain, for anybody to understand and anticipate what acts are being prohibited by the Legislature. Consequently, it is urged that it cannot be called a law and must be struck down as such.
There may be no dispute about the proposition that if a law goes beyond the frontiers that are fixed for a legislature or where a law infringes a fundamental right, or a law, particularly, criminal, is vague, uncertain or broad, it must be struck down as a void law, to the extent of the objection. The appellants, however, have not shown or demonstrated as to where is that vagueness. In order to succeed, the appellants ought to have shown that the constituents of the offense, as given in the law are so indefinite that line between innocent and condemned conduct cannot be drawn or there are attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement or that it is so vague on the fact of it that common man must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
According to the dictionary, ‘pose’ means to claim or propound. In this case the law is addressing the members of Quadiani or Lahori group. They have a historical background of serious conflict with the main body of Muslims, for the beliefs the relevant of which may be discussed later. These have already been discussed in some details in the judgment of Mujibur Rehman (PLD 1985 FSC 8) and also in the judgment of the High Court. The Ahmadis claim Mirza Sahib is himself a prophet and those who do not believe in and follow him are infidels. The right to the use of the above mentioned epithets etc., by the Ahmadis, for those connected with Mirza Sahib, is on account of that connection alone and is to be seen in that light.
So it will only be a question of fact, to be proved by evidence, that the accused did use the epithets etc., or if his attitude or conduct amounted to that what is provided in the law. The appellants are, undoubtedly Ahmadis, and are non-Muslims according to the Constitution. Their use of the ‘Shaa’ire Islam’ etc., thus amounts to either posing as Muslims or to deceive others or to ridicule. In any case, the fact whether, they were posing as such can be clearly proved. They, therefore, have not made out a case and are raising only a controversy without a sound basis. Undoubtedly, there is no vagueness in the law at all.
The Pakistan Penal Code which is mostly the same as Indian Penal Code, contains offense of personation, in sections 140, 170, 171, 171D, 205, 229 and 416. This offense is somewhat similar to the one under discussion and its wording may also be considered to test the plea raised.
Section 140 says whoever, not being a soldier, sailor or airman in the Military, Naval or Air Service of the Government of Pakistan, wears any garb or carries any token resembling any garb or token used by such a soldier, sailor or airman … shall be punished….
Section 171 similarly makes offense wearing garb etc. used by a class of public servants. These two sections rely on visible indicators.
Section 171D, makes offense even applying for a voting paper or votes in the name of another person whether living or dead, The evidence in that case will be only of that conduct.
Section 205 is a different brand altogether. It provides; whoever falsely impersonates another, and in such assumed character makes any admission or statement … shall be punished…
Section 229 creates an offense to become of juror by impersonation or otherwise. Last is section 416, ‘to cheat by impersonation’ by pretending to be some other person.
No objection of the nature, as raised by the appellants, has ever been taken by any one against any of the above sections, since 1860, when this code was promulgated and enforced, though these sections deal with a similar subject but may not claim the precision demanded by the appellants. Even no court ever suggested any vagueness or other deficiency, so as to hinder their administration. The phrase mentioned above thus does not suffer from any such defect.
The impugned Ordinance, on the other hand, gives the actual epithets, the descriptions and also titles and other requirements sought to be protected or imposed. It is also stated that they cannot be used for entities or situations other than those for whom they have been prescribed. The Ahmadis have been desecrating them and using them for their own leaders and practices etc., to deceive the people that they are also of the same type status and the calibre. This practice not only deceived innocent, simple and not-well-informed people but also created law and order situation throughout the period. The legislation was, therefore, necessary, which in any way does not interfere with the religious freedom of the Ahmadis; for it only prohibits them from using those epithets etc., on which they have no claim of any nature. It does not prohibit them from coining their own.
We may test the plea further in the light of some foreign jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court observed in Lanzetta vs. New Jersey, (306 U.S. 451, 1939) that vagueness is a constitutional vice conceptually distinct from overbreadth in that an overbroad law need lack neither clarity nor precision, and a vague law need not reach activity protected by the first amendment. As a matter of due process, a law is void on the face of it, if it is so vague that persons:
“of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”. (See 30 Connally vs. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391). Such vagueness occurs when a legislature states its prescriptions in terms so indefinite that line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guess work and that the discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards. The plea gather no help from the above either, as the contents of the law, in the light of the Constitution and the ‘Shasire Islam’ seem to be precise and clear. The law is not vague in any juristic sense.
It has also been discussed in detail above that legislation just to preserve law and order has never been considered oppressive in any country of the world. Again, no legal system in the world will allow a community, howsoever vocal, organized, affluent or influential it may be, to cheat others of their faith or rights, usurp their heritage and to deliberately and knowingly do such acts or take such measures as may create law and order situation.
The other submission raised on behalf of the appellant that the word ‘law’, used in the phrase ‘subject to law’, in Article 20, means ‘positive law’ and not Islamic law. Reliance was placed on the following cases decided by this Court:
Asma Jilani case, PLD 1972 SC 139 Brig. (Retd) F.B. Ali vs. The State, PLD 1975 SC 506; Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills, Ltd., Karachi, PLD 1977 SC 397; Fauji Foundation vs. Shamimur Rehman, PLD 1983 SC 457. The contention, however, has not impressed us at all. The term ‘positive law’, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, in the law actually enacted or adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized jural society. So this term comprises not only enacted law but also adopted law. It is to be noted that all the above noted cases were decided prior to the induction of Article 2A in the Constitution, which reads as under:
“2A. Objectives Resolution to form part of substantive provisions. The principles and provisions set out in the Objective Resolution reproduced in the Annex are hereby made substantive part of the Constitution and shall have effect accordingly.” It was for the first time in the Constitutional history of Pakistan, that the Objective Resolution, which hence-forth formed part of every constitution as a preamble, was adopted and incorporated in the Constitution, in 1985, and made its effective part. This was an act of the adoption of a body of law by reference, which is not unknown to the lawyers. It is generally done whenever a new legal order is enforced. Here in this country, it had been done after every martial law was imposed or the constitutional order restored after the lifting of martial law. The legislature in the British days had also adopted the Muslim and other religious and customary laws, in the same manner, and they were considered as the positive laws.
This was the stage, when the chosen representatives of people, for the first time accepted the sovereignty of Allah, as the operative part of the Constitution, to be binding on them and vowed that they will exercise only the delegated powers, within the limits fixed by Allah. The power of judicial review of the superior courts also got enhanced.
The above mentioned constitutional change has been acknowledged and accepted as effective by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, considering the changed authority of the representatives of the people, in the case, Pakistan v. Public at Large, (PLD 1987 SC 304 at p. 356), stated as follows:
“Accordingly, unless it can be shown definitely that the body of Muslims sitting in the legislature have enacted something which is forbidden by Almighty Allah in the Holy Quran or by the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet or of some principle emanating by necessary intendment therefrom no Court can declare such an enactment to be un-Islamic”. Mr. Justice Shafiur Rahman, in his judgment in the same case, also relied on the Article 2A (Objectives Resolution), in forming his view at pages 361 and 362, of the above judgment, as follows:
“The concept of delegated authority held in trust enshrined in verse 58 has invariably and consistently been given an extended meaning. Additionally all authority being delegated authority and being trust, and a sacred one for that matter, must have well defined limits on its enjoyment or exercise. In the Holy Quran more so, but also both in the Western and Eastern jurisprudence delegated authority held in trust has the following attributes:
(i) | The authority so delegated to, and held in trust by, various functionaries of the State including its head must be exercised so as to protect, preserve, effectuate and advance the object and purposes of the trust, |
(ii) | All authority so enjoyed must be accountable at every stage, and at all times, like that of trustee, both in hierarchical order going back to the ultimate delegator, and at the other end to the beneficiary of the trust; and |
(iii) | In discharging the trust and in exercising this delegated authority, there should not only be substantive compliance but also procedural fairness.” |
This aspect was made absolutely clear by the Supreme Court in Federation of Pakistan vs. N.W. F. P. Government (PLD 1990 S.C. 1172 at page 1175) in the following words:
“It is held and ordered that even if the required law is not enacted and/or enforced by 12th of Rabi-ul-Awwal 1411 A.B., the said provision would nevertheless cease to have effect on 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal. In such state of vacuum, vis-à-vis, the statute law on the subject, the common Islamic law/the Injunctions of Islam as contained in Quran and Sunnah relating to offenses of Qatl and Jurh (hurt) shall be deemed to be the law on the subject. The Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code shall then be applied mutatis mutandis, only as aforesaid.” It is thus clear that the Constitution has adopted the Injunctions of Islam as contained in Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet as the real and the effective law. In that view of the matter, the Injunctions of Islam as contained in Quaran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet are now the positive law. The Article 2A, made effective and operative the sovereignty of Almighty Allah and it is because of that Article that the legal provisions and principles of law, as embodied in the Objectives Resolution, have become effective and operative. Therefore, every manmade law must now conform to the Injunctions of Islam as contained in Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet(pbuh). Therefore, even the Fundamental Rights as given in the Constitution must not violate the norms of Islam.
It was also argued that the phrase ‘glory of law’ as used in Article 19 of the Constitution cannot be availed with regard to the rights conferred in Article 20. Article 19 which guarantees freedom of speech, expression and press makes it subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of glory of Islam etc., and decency or morality. The restrictions given therein cannot, undoubtedly, be imported into any other fundamental right. Anything, in any fundamental right, which violates the Injunctions of Islam thus must be repugnant. It must be noted here that the Injunctions of Islam, as contained in Quran and the Sunnah, guarantee the rights of the minorities also in such a satisfactory way that no other legal order can offer anything equal. It may further be added that no law can violate them.
It is not correct to say that ‘Azan’ is not mentioned in the Ordinance. In fact sub-section (2) of Section 298-B is exclusively devoted to it. As about the use of ‘Kalima’ by the Ahmadis, in the light of the Ordinance, reference be made to Section 28-C. The ‘Kalima’ is a covenant, on reciting which a non-believer enters the fold of Islam. It is in Arabic form, is exclusive to Muslims who recite it, not only as proof of their faith but very often, for spiritual well being. The ‘Kalima’ means there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet. The belief of Quadianis is that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is (God forbid) Muhammad incarnate. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad wrote in his book, Aik Ghalti Ka Izala, page 4, 3rd Edition, published Rabwah, that:
“in the revelation of verse 48:29, (Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle …. ) Allah named him Muhammad”,. 81. In the ‘Akhbar Badar’, Qadian, dated October 25, 1906, there is a poem, written by Qazi Zahooruddin Akmal, former editor of ‘Review of Religions’, a couplet of which states:
“Muhammad has come back to us, with higher glory and one who wants to see Muhammad accomplished, should go to Qadian. ” This poem was read to Mirza Sahib and he appreciated it. Again in Arbaeen, vol. 4 page 17, he wrote:
“The rays of sun cannot be endured now and we need soothing light, which I am, in the form of Ahmad’. In Khutba Ilhamia, page 171, he declared:
“One who distinguishes between me and Muhammad, he has neither seen me nor known me.” Mirza Ghulam Ahmad further announced:
“I am the accomplishment of the name of Muhammad, i.e. I am shadow of Muhammad”. (See Ha’shin Haqiqatul Wahi, page 72): “I am in view of the verse 62:3 (It is He who has sent forth among the unlettered an apostle of their own to recite to them His revelations to purify them and instruct them in scriptures and wisdom … ); I am the same last Prophet incarnate and God named me in Braheene Ahmadia’ Muhammad and Ahmad, and declared me as personified Muhammad…… (See Aik Ghalti Ka Izala, pages 10-11, published Rabwah).
“I am that mirror which reflects exactly the person and the prophethood of Muhammad”. (Nazulul Masih, page 48, published Qadian, 1909.) In the light of what has been said above, there is general consensus among Muslims that whenever, as Ahmadi recites or displays ‘Kalima’, he proclaims that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the Prophet who should be obeyed and the one who does not do that is an infidel. In the alternative, they pose as Muslims and deceive others. Lastly, they either ridicule Muslims or deny that the teachings of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) do not govern the situation. So whatever the situation, the commission of the offense, one way or the other, may be proved.
82. Not only that Mirza Sahib, in his writings, tried to belittle the glory and grace of the Holy Prophet(pbuh), he even ridiculed him occasionally. In Ha’shia Tuhfa Golria’ page 165, Mirza Sahib wrote that:
“the Holy Prophet could not conclude that propagation of Islam and I complete the same”. Again said:
“the Holy Prophet could not understand some of the revelations and he made many mistakes. (See Izalatul Auham, Lahori Press)”. He further said:
“the Holy Prophet had 3 thousands miracles” (See Tuhfa Golria page 67 - published Rabwah) “while I have one million signs”. (See Braheen Ahmadia, page 56). “The Holy Prophet used to eat cheese made by Christians to which they added the pig’s fat”. Mirza Bashir Ahmad wrote in his book ‘Kalimatul Fasal’ page 113, that:
“when Mirza Sahib was bestowed with prophethood, he had attained all the spiritual heights of the Muhammad’s Prophethood and was qualified to be called Prophet incarnate and he went so ahead that he stood side by side with Muhammad (pbuh).” There are many more writings like that but this record may not be burdened further.
83. It is the cardinal faith of every Muslim to believe in every Prophet and praise him. Therefore, if anything is said against the Prophet, it will injure the feelings of a Muslim and may even incite him to the breach of peace, depending on the intensity of the attack. The learned Judge in the High Court has quoted extensively from the Ahmadi literature to show how Mirza Ghulam Ahmad belittled also the other Prophets, particularly, Jesus Christ, whose place he wanted to occupy. We may not, however, repeat that material but two examples may suffice. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad wrote:
“The miracles that the other Prophets possessed individually were all granted to Muhammad (pbuh). They all were then given to me as I am his shadow. It is for this reason that my names are Adam, Abraham, Moses, Noha, David, Joseph, Soloman, John, and Jesus Christ… ” (Matfoozaat Vol. 3, page 270, Printed Rabwah). About Jesus Christ he stated:
“The ancestors of Jesus Christ were pious and innocent? His three paternal grand mothers and matemal grandmothers were prostitutes and whores and that is the blood he represents.” (Appendix Anjaame Atham, note 7). Quran, on the other hand, praises Jesus Christ, his mother and his family. (See 3: 33-37, 3:45-47, 19:16-32). Can any Muslim utter anything against Quran and can anyone who does so claim to be a Muslim? How can then Mirza Ghulam Ahmed or his followers claim to be Muslims? It may also be noted here that, for his above writings, Mirza Sahib could have been convicted and punished, by an English Court, for the offense of blasphemy, under the Blasphemy Act, 1679, with a term of imprisonment.
84. Again, as for the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is concerned:
“…every Muslim who is firm in his faith, must love him more than his children, family, parents and much more than any one else in the world.” (See Al-Bukhari, Kitabul Eeman, Bab Hubbul Rasool Min-al Eeman). Can than anyone blame a Muslim if he loses control of himself on hearing, reading or seeing such blasphemous material as has been produced by Mirza Sahib?
85. It is in this background that one should visualize the public conduct of Ahmadis, at the centenary celebrations and imagine the reaction that it might have attracted from the Muslims. So, if an Ahmadi is allowed by the administration or the law to display or chant in public, the Shaa’re Islam’, it is like creating a Rushdi’ out of him. Can the administration in that case guarantee his life, liberty and property and if so at what cost? Again, if this permission is given to a procession or assembly, on the streets or a public place, it is like permitting civil war. It is not a mere guesswork. It has happened, in fact many a time, in the past, and had been checked at cost of colossal loss of life and property (For details, Munir’s report may be seen). The reason is that when an Ahmadi or Ahmadis display in public, on a placard, a badge or a poster or write on walls or ceremonial gates or huntings, the ‘Kalima’, or chant other ‘Shaa’ire Islam’ it would amount to publicly defiling the name of Holy Prophet(pbuh) and also other Prophets, and exalting the name of Mirza Sahib, thus infuriating and instigating the Muslims so that there may be a serious cause for disturbance of the public peace, order and tranquillity and it may result in loss of life and property. The preventive actions in such situations are imperative in order to maintain law and order and save loss or damage to life and property particularly of Ahmadis. In that situation, the decisions of the concerned local authorities cannot be overruled by this Court, in this jurisdiction. they are the best Judges unless contrary is proved in law or fact.
86. The action which gave rise to the present proceedings arose out of the order of the District Magistrate, passed under section 144 Cr. P.C. The Ahmadia community who are the predominant residents of Rabwah were informed of the order of the District Magistrate through their office bearers, by the Resident Magistrate and directed to remove ceremonial gates, banners and illuminations and further ensure that no further writing will be done on the walls. The appellants could not show that the above practices are essential and integral part of their religion. Even the holding of centenary celebrations on the roads and streets was not shown to be the essential and integral part of their religion.
87. The question whether such a requirement is a part of freedom of religion and if they are subject to public safety, law and order etc. has already been discussed in detail, in the light of the judgments from countries like Australia, and the United States, where the fundamental rights are given top priority. We have also quoted judgments even from India. Nowhere the practices which are neither essential nor, integral part of the religion are given priority over the public safety and the law and order. Rather, even the essential religious practices have been sacrificed at the altar of public safety and tranquillity.
88. It is stated by the appellants that they wanted to celebrate the 100 years Ahmadia movement in a harmless and innocent manner, inter alia, by offering special thanks-giving prayers, distribution of sweets amongst children, and servicing of food to the poor. We do not find any order stopping these activities, in private. The Ahmadis like other minorities are free to profess their religion in this country and no one can take away that right of theirs, either by legislation or by executive orders. They must, however, honor the Constitution and the law and should neither desecrate or defile the pious personage of any other religious including Islam, nor should they use their exclusive epithets, descriptions and titles and also avoid using the exclusive names like mosque and practice like ‘Azan’, so that the feelings of the Muslim community are not injured and the people are not mislead or deceived as regard the faith.
89. We also do not think that the Ahmadis will face any difficulty in coining new names, epithets, titles and descriptions for their personages, places and practices. After all, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs and other communities have their own epithets etc., and are celebrating their festivals peacefully and without any law and order problem and trouble. However, the executive, being always under a duty to preserve law and order and safeguard the life, liberty, property and honor of the citizens, shall intervene if there is a threat to any of the above values.
90. It may be mentioned here that the learned single Judge has passed a detailed and well-reasoned order and has sagaciously and candidly taken into consideration judgments from such foreign jurisdictions which would infuse confidence in this hypersensitive, non-Muslim minority, i.e. Ahmadis. Therefore, we instead of further burdening the record, would adopt his reasoning also. The Ordinance is thus held to be not ultravires of the Constitution. The result is that we find that neither is Article 20 of the Constitution attracted to the facts of the case nor is there any merit in this Appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
91. As a result of the above discussion, the connected appeals are also dismissed.
Self Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, J.
Self Muhammad Afzal Lone,
Jr. Self Wali Muhammad Khan, J.(signed)
SALEEM AKHTAR, J.: -
| The appellants have claimed protection of their right under Articles 19, 20 and 25 on the basis of being a minority as declared by the Constitution. They admit to be a minority in terms of the Constitution as distinguished from the Muslims. Their claim being that they should be treated equally under law like other minorities enjoying freedom of speech and expression and they should be allowed to profess, practice and propagate their religion. The first claim is covered by Articles 19 and 25 while the second one is based on Article 20. |
| Law permits reasonable classification and distinction in the same class of persons, but it should be founded on reasonable distinction and reasonable basis. Reference can be made to Government of Baluchistan v. Azizullah Memon (PLD 1993 S.C. 341). The Quadianis/Ahmadis on the basis of their faith and religion as elucidated by my learned brother Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry J. vis-a-vis. Muslims stand at a different pedestal as compared to other minorities. Therefore, considering these facts and in order to maintain public order it was felt necessary to classify them differently and promulgate the impugned law to meet the situation. The classification being proper and reasonable, the impugned law does not offend Articles 19 & 25. |
| As regards applicability of Article 2A, I reiterate the view expressed in Hakim Khan’s case (PLD 1992 S.C. 595). |
| The freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article 20 which includes the right to profess, practice and propagate. The over-riding limitation as provided by Article 20 is the law, public order and morality. The law cannot over-ride Article 20 but has to protect the freedom of religion without transgressing bounds of morality and public order. Propagation of religion by the appellants who as distinguished from other minorities, having different background and history, may be restricted to maintain public order and morality. Therefore, their right to profess, practice and propagate their religion cannot be restricted provided they profess, propagate and practice without adopting Sharia-e-Islam in a manner which does not offend the feelings of the Muslims. |
| I agree with my learned brother Shafiur Rahman J. that clauses (a), (b) and (e) of section 298C PPC do not offend Articles 19, 20 and 260(3). |
| As regards Section 298C clauses (c) + (d), in my view they will not be violative of Article 20 provided they are acted upon by the Quadianis/Ahmadis without adopting any of the Sharia-e-Islam. |
| Consequently, I would dismiss C.A. No. 149/1989 and C.A.No. 150/1989 and remand C. A. No. 31-K/1988, 32-K/1988, 33-K/1988 and 34-K, 1988 and 35-K/1988 for re-trial. |
In C. A. No. 412/1992 in view of section 144(6), the District/Resident Magistrate had no jurisdiction to enforce the order under section 144 Cr. P.C. for an unlimited period. It is therefore partly allowed to that extent.
Self Saleem Akhtar, J.
(Signed)
ORDER OF THE COURT
The Court by majority holds that all appeals preferred are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.
The convicts in Criminal Appeals 31-K to 35-K of 1989 who are on bail shall be taken into custody forthwith and they are required to undergo the remainder of the punishment awarded by the Court.
Self Shafiur Rahman, J.
Self Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, J.
Self Muhammad Afzal Lone, J.
Self Saleem Akhtor, J.
Self Wali Mohammad Khan, J.
Self Shafiur Rehman ACJ
Announced in Chamber
Islamabad, 3/7/93
APPROVED FOR REPORTING
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